

CITIZEN-DRIVEN APPROACHES (CDA) FOR COMBATING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CORRUPTION IN UGANDA'S LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS: AN EMPIRICAL SURVEY

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ABSTRACT. Corruption in public procurement is a monster that continues to inflict pain and misery to the innocent poor citizens through denial of better services. While many good legislations and institutional frameworks have been put in place to fight corruption in Uganda; the results have remained disappointing as these old approaches have just produced poor results. Managing the public procurement function was during the procurement reforms (from 2003 to date) removed from control by the politicians to technical staff with the goal of reducing corruption and improving efficiency. Unfortunately, these goals have not been achieved. In this paper, we advocate for the use of citizen-driven approaches (CDAs) as an alternative strategy for addressing the public procurement corruption malaise in Uganda's local governments. Secondly, the paper examines the contradictions associated with using this approach and suggestions on what governments ought to do if they are to achieve benefits from this approach. By using empirical findings from over 1000 randomly sampled respondents in the four regions of Uganda, our paper presents original contributions to the growing body of knowledge of public procurement. The paper suggests that social Accountability (SAc) as a process of constructive engagement between citizens and government aimed at improving performance in the use of public resources to deliver services needs a strategic approach to its application.

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INTRODUCTION

The heart of effective service delivery in Uganda is centered on how public procurement systems are managed given that almost over 70% of Uganda's budget is on public expenditure (Background to the Budget, 2009). Public procurement is effectively used as a policy tool for poverty reduction and governance. However, this function of government is facing serious integrity challenges and corruption in particular which is increasing at a very fast rate. The demand for a strong and clean process by citizens, therefore, cannot be over emphasized. This should especially be so, in order to proactively promote fair competition, value for money and transparency in contracting processes in public sector organisations. In democratic societies where governments derive their authority from the citizens, the delivery of public services to citizen's satisfaction should be a primary philosophy. In democratic nations, citizens own the countries while public officials are simply servants. Public officials and service providers need to be answerable to citizens for their actions and behavior as should ideally be measured by the way public officials approach their work -in an open, transparent, and responsive manner (Rasheed and Olowo, 1994). Regrettably, this in most cases does not happen in a number of countries, Uganda inclusive. Uganda like any other country of the developing ilk has not performed well in its democratic responsibilities to its citizens. Government revenue and its expenditure; expressed through a country's budget, need to follow prescribed rules and regulations that derive from the democratic principles.

In the past decade, a substantial number of governments, donors and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have focused efforts on a range of institutional, financial, technical and social interventions aimed at bringing about much-needed improvements in public procurement in Africa. Yet the attainment of a corruption free public procurement is still nonexistent. The misuse of existing public resources brings into question of the wisdom citizens could play to combat procurement corruption especially when much of the funding available in ministries, local governments, utilities and village administrations is being used by public office for private gain. Strong Public Financial Management (PFM) systems are essential to improve

the efficiency and effectiveness of public services and they today more than ever before appear important pillars for any poverty reduction strategy of any government. Citizens; particularly those considered poor and of the vulnerable majority ilk ;often get a low deal participating in public finance policy matters not only at the design but the implementation stages. It is common for designers of policies to ignore citizen's participation other than at 'evaluation stages' but even here they are made mere sources of information for policies. Participation by citizens in is regarded as a 'taboo' by some public officers and yet, such officers are only servants of the people. Government institutions are therefore notoriously known for their unresponsiveness and unaccountable practices to the poor. In almost all African countries, deficiencies in governance are at the root of a myriad of development problems afflicting the continent. Improved governance is therefore at the heart of any efforts of uplifting the continent from the theatre of operational underdevelopment.

The early literature on public administration and business administration was focused on the elimination of abuse, inefficiency and fraud, in the context of procurement practices (Sementelli, 2011: 47). Since the increased involvement of public administrators in the actions and activities of organized society has continued over time (Cox, Buck and Morgan, 2011:1), we deduce that public procurement has remained an important part of government and will possibly continue to do so in future. No activities of government can effectively be conducted without the process of acquiring appropriate quality and quantity goods, and services at the right time. On this debate, Cogburn (2003) reminds us that if the procurement function fails to deliver quality goods and services, in a timely fashion, and at an economical price, then the performance of government suffers. Unfortunately, as Thai (2008) reports that public procurement is most prone to corruption particularly in developing countries. This malaise has been widely reported in various discourses about Uganda's body politic. It is a problem that affects capacity of government to perform its function.

The Corruption Perception Index (CPI Report; 2011) indicates a grey picture about Uganda's corruption credentials. It was pointed out that Uganda is the third most corrupt country in the East African

region preceded by Burundi and Kenya which took the first and second 'unenviable' positions respectively. The second Annual Report on Corruption Trends in Uganda: Using the Data tracking mechanism which was conducted by the Economic Policy Research Centre based at Makerere University and launched by the Inspectorate of Government on November 15th 2011, reported that the corruption problem in the country was now entrenched. Transparency International (TI) launched its East African Bribery index report of 2011 where it was indicated that 68% of the respondents interviewed felt that the incidence of corruption in Uganda had increased. About the same number (65.6%) believed that the problem would increase in the New Year. According to the Baseline Survey of National Public Procurement Integrity Report (2006) sanctioned by the Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority (PPDA), the Inspectorate of Government (IGG) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) it was reported that illegal payments to secure government contracts at both the local and the central levels were even higher, representing approximately 7 to 9% of the contract value.

Public accountability has become difficult to guarantee due to a variety of factors such as politico-bureaucratic institutions (Siddiquee, 2007), rendering accountability mechanisms ineffective. This has given rise to new approaches including citizen driven approaches or what some people prefer to call social accountability. Accountability (vertical and horizontal) involves officials being responsible for the consequences of their actions or inactions (Burke, 1986 and Cooper, 1990). Although, several analysts such as Lappe and Du Bois (1997); Putnam (1995) have debated whether civic engagement has an impact on ensuring accountability, recent developments on the activate involving citizens in addressing long standing societal problems have been confirmed. The 'noise' from citizens has seen the eventual collapse of powerful military regimes. This can be evidenced from the recent social movements in the Arab World which testify at least to the capacity of citizens to cause the desired change in society. Governments have 'fallen' due to 'noise' from the citizens (Mubangizi and Basheka, 2011).

The paper suggests that social Accountability (SAc) as a process of constructive engagement between citizens and government aimed at improving performance in the use of public resources to deliver services needs a strategic approach to its application. In this effort, we interrogate two forces that ought to drive social accountability: citizen groups, who are direct beneficiaries of public services, and government, which provides the open space for citizen participation in monitoring public programs. This paper attempts to answer five interrelated questions namely: (1) in which areas can citizen involvement be applied effectively in fighting public procurement corruption in Uganda(2) what effective citizen-driven approaches can be used to reduce corruption in public procurement; (3) what level of citizens' involvement can be applied in fighting public procurement corruption in Uganda; (4) What role can civil society organizations play in the fight against corruption and what is their readiness . Finally, issue 5 relates to the underlying reasons for failure of anti-corruption efforts and what ought to be done if a successful anti-corruption strategy is to be developed.

RESEARCH PROBLEM

Corruption in public procurement process has become increasingly critical to many organizations both public and private (Carter, 2000) and has attracted significant attention from governments, civil society institutions and international bodies. In Uganda, the government attaches a great deal of importance to tackling the problem of corruption, for it is aware that corruption undermines good governance and retards economic development to which it is committed. It has hence set up several institutions such as; Inspector of Government (IGG), Ministry of Gender, Ethics and integrity, Public Accounts Committee (PAC), Auditor General (AG) among others, aimed at stamping out corruption from government departments. Corruption is an unethical and illegal practice that bleeds the public purse, erodes public and business confidence in government as provider and customer respectively and increases indebtedness. Corruption specific to public procurement especially harms the poor because it distorts the allocation of scarce resources (Ackermann, 1998).

Despite efforts by Government and its development partners to curb corruption, it has persisted in public procurement. The

National Development Plan (2010) has identified public procurement corruption as one of the major factors likely to prevent Uganda from achieving its goals. While several institutions have been instituted with the hope to provide solutions to this cancerous problem, emphasis on citizen involvement has been limited. This study intends to venture into this unique area and fill in the gaps. The procurement process still has a lot of problems including influence peddling, intrigue, and lack of transparency in selecting the lead agencies to be funded. This has led to non-optimization of resources e.g. shoddy work, collapsing pit latrines and school blocks and uncompleted hospital theatres, defective equipment, shortage of medicines, textbooks, school desks (Wasike, 2007; Coronel and Tirol, 2002). Public and private individuals have abused the public trust to enrich themselves. The actions of these individuals have created the appearance that contracts are not awarded in a fair and open process, and that contractors must “pay to play”. This has serious implications which may possibly derail the development process. Therefore the war on corruption in public procurement must be won possibly with the role of citizens.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Corruption is defined variously by several authors as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain (Transparency International (TI), 2002; Duperouzel, 2005; Shah 2006; Andvig, 2006; Kaufman and Vicente 2005; Mishra, 2006). In recent years, civic engagement is being increasingly viewed as a promising approach to improve the performance in the public sector. Examples of citizen’ initiatives include ‘traditional’ forms, such as public demonstrations, advocacy campaigns, investigative journalism; and, the recent ones such as citizen report cards, participatory public policy making, public expenditure tracking, and “efforts to improve the effectiveness of “internal” accountability mechanisms of the government, for example by involving citizens in public commissions and hearings and oversight committees” (Malena, Forster and Singh, 2004: 4). It has also been suggested that social accountability initiatives are most effective when these are ‘institutionalized’ and when the states’ ‘internal’ (horizontal) accountability mechanisms are “more transparent and open to civic involvement.” (2004: 4) Thus,

transparency is inextricably linked to accountability. The proponents of social accountability maintain that by involving citizens in initiatives geared towards demanding accountability of elected leaders strengthens democracy and in our case will reduce corruption in public procurement.

Previous efforts that relied on central state machinery for fighting development problems and improving service delivery was under attack by the New Public Management (NPM) advocates who favored the use of markets in public service delivery. It was argued by advocates of the structural adjustments and other neo-liberal economic reform Programs that the role of a capable state for effective interaction with markets and citizens was not a solution any more. Since emergence of the market-based approaches, debate, a number of new approaches for impressing the citizens have been thrown around. Two connected areas that have purely worked as an experimental laboratory for such approaches is that of corruption and accountability. Poor people are the greatest beneficiaries of effective social accountability initiatives and reduced corruption as they are the “most reliant on government services and least equipped to hold government officials accountable” (Malena, Forster and Singh, 2004: 5). They are also the worst hit when corruption problem is allowed to go out of control.

The monitoring of government performance and demand for transparency protects against corruption. The World Bank has identified various types of social accountability mechanisms that can be applied at different stages of the policy sequence. These mechanisms operate along the budget and public expenditure cycle, understanding that budgets and their execution more truthfully reflect actual policy decisions and their implementation (Wagle and Shah, 2002). Irrespective of the actors involved, corruption flourishes when the incentives exist for it to do so. Corruption is driven by need, greed or opportunity for money or power (Klitgaard, and Maclean-Abaroa, 2000) or the need for services (Plummer and Cross, 2005). Reasons for increased corruption might suggest that lower-level poorly paid officials have the need to supplement their income, middle level managers have ample opportunity, and politicians, senior managers and directors are driven by greed. Yet public officials at all levels shoulder a range of responsibilities and must meet the obligations

that come with their position (Burgess, 2006). Addressing such a complex problem requires the participation of different stakeholders.

In Bangladesh, participatory budgeting programs at the *Union Parishad*, the lowest tier of local government with the help of non-governmental organizations have assisted citizens to monitor quality spending of local governments through the instrument of open budget sessions (Rahman, 2005). Jembrana, Bali in Indonesia has also been cited as an example of good local governance by various parties and agencies in Indonesia (Brodjonegoro, 2005). Jembrana is part of the Bali Island with a population of 221,616 and an area of 84,180 square kilometers with an economy dependent on agriculture. The government of Jembrana capitalized on the efficiency of local budget management. Local community was encouraged to participate in executing local programs in education. The community developed their respective schools based on their needs, rather than on local government plan. The Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys in Uganda was a model for participatory expenditure tracking. In 1995, for every dollar spent on non-wage education items by the central government, only about 20 cents reached the schools with local government capturing most of the funds leaving the poorer schools under-resourced. Due to tracking measures, primary school enrollment in Uganda rose from 3.6 million students to 6.9 students between 1996 and 2001; and the share of funds reaching schools increased from 20% in 1995 to 80% in 2001 (Brodjonegoro, 2005). However, all these effort are likely to be eroded by corruption in public sectors particularly in public procurement. This monster is continuously inflicting pain and misery to the majority of poor citizens. This position results from the fact that in Uganda, procurement accounts for over 70% of the national budget. Misuse of monies intended for procurement of works, services and supplies has implications on the kind of public services delivered. While many legislations and institutional frameworks have been put in place to fight corruption; the results have remained disappointing hence a new demand for citizen-driven approaches. In this paper, we present contradictions associated with using this approach.

Lerrick (2005: 2) argues that 'corruption is not just one of the causes of intractable poverty in Africa but a root cause'. Ribadu

(2007), while citing the 2007 African Union Report asserts that corruption drains an estimated \$140 billion a year – which is about 25 percent of the continent's official Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, the author does not indicate whether this phenomenon is procurement related or otherwise. Corruption and poor governance may explain why increased fund allocations, such as those aimed at meeting the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), have not necessarily translated into improvement in human development indicators particularly for Africa (World Bank, 2010). Corruption places unbearable burden on the most vulnerable people, and hinders development towards poverty reduction (Harris, 2005:19).

It ought to be noted, that much of the recent literature on corruption hinges on analyzing its causes and consequences in areas such as local governments, procurement auctions, taxation, economic growth, bureaucratic red-tape and economic integration (Basheka and Bisangabasaija, 2010; Basheka. 2009; Oluka and Sssenoga, 2010; Palmier,2000; Duperouzel, 2005; Khai, 2006; de Graaf, 2007; Bannerjee 1997; Bibhas 2003; Compte, Lambert-Mogiliansky, and Verdier 2005; Ganuza and Hauk 2004; Gurgur and Shah 2005; Marjit et al. 2000, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Wallace and Haerpfer 2000). Despite the fact that several analyses have been done to gauge the effectiveness of anti-corruption programs throughout the procurement process, there appears to be few examinations that focus on citizens' role in developing countries. Further, the adoption of various procurement reforms have not resulted in reduced level of corruption as anticipated in the general contracting process.

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Diverse theories have been developed to explain opportunistic behavior in public contracting and has been a growing research focus area over the last two decades in the developed world (Mysen, Svensson and Payan, 2011, Hawkins, Knipper and Strutton, 2009, Crosno and Dahlstrom, 2008; Hawkins, Wittmann and Beyerlein, 2008; Crosno and Dahlstrom, 2010). Although citizen-driven approaches have had a long historical journey, they have of recent gained unmatched momentum in the practical world of public governance as a result of the apparent mistrust and failure of existing

institutions of government. And yet, scholars have not given these approaches adequate attention, a situation that has created a knowledge gap in the body of knowledge of public administration. Moreover, there is almost total absence of empirical studies on public procurement corruption in Uganda relying on these approaches. This lack of information on such a subject is regrettable as it is the kind of information that would inform policy making in addressing the monster of corruption in a local government context. Our study addressed this limitation. Malena, Forster and Singh (2004) contend that the more the poor people rely on government services, and given the fact that they are expected to hold government officials accountable” the more they become agitated to social accountability movements which are usually informal in nature. Citizen driven approaches work well alongside the formal systems of accountability as proposed by Simon, Thompson, and Smithburg (1991). The authors assert that formal mechanisms are based on judicial, legislative, and executive or hierarchical controls, whereas informal mechanisms are derived from society's norms, political and social philosophies, bureau philosophy and culture among others.

A working definition of accountability describes it is a “proactive process by which public officials inform and justify their plans of action, their behavior, and results and are sanctioned accordingly” (Ackerman, 2004: 3). Accountability mechanisms can broadly be classified as either ‘horizontal’ or ‘vertical.’ The former can occur internally (for example, an internal audit within a government agency) and can be among equals (for example, legislators holding each other accountable). Horizontal mechanisms occur externally and involve one party holding another accountable and therefore exercising ‘superior authority’ or greater power. Among the various mechanisms of promoting accountability, we focus on social accountability here given its role in facilitating civic engagement aimed towards improving the living conditions of the poor.

Social Accountability (SAC) – as a concept and an application has been defined as “an approach towards building accountability that relies on civic engagement, i.e., in which it is ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations who participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability” (Malena, Forster and Singh, 2004: 1). The

mechanisms for implementing this form of accountability are 'vertical' and focuses on the ways in which non-state or social actors can hold public officials accountable through various mechanisms (Malena et al, 2004). Smulovitz and Peruzzotti (2000) emphasize the mode of social accountability as sponsored by civil society organizations, social movements and media. Public demonstrations, protests, advocacy campaigns, investigative journalism and public interest law suits are commonly used mechanisms. The state is not a single actor. Rather, there is a multiplicity or plurality of institutions which are supposed to coordinate and network with each other more through horizontal linkages (Chandhoke, 2003).

Corruption in procurement, according to Galtung (2001), involves engaging in conspiracy, bribes and kickbacks which in turn result in overpayment for goods and contracted services, or in failure to implement contractual standards for quality (Blechingner, 2005). Conflict of interest, bribery, embezzlement, kickbacks, tender manipulation and fraud are observed corruption practices in the public procurement (White, 2005). The severity of corruption practices has intensified the search for more innovative means of curbing the vice which erodes the principle of value-for-money.

Experience in anti-corruption activity to date has provided a set of anti-corruption mechanisms fundamental to good governance and applicable to public procurement anti-corruption reform. Best practice suggests that more demand-side efforts are needed to support the technical approaches to improved procurement performance carried out in many countries over the last decade. Further consideration is needed of the applicability and impact of all approaches, their blending and sequencing within the public procurement and in particular contexts. Effective anti-corruption policy depends on sound diagnosis and understanding of the procurement context. As such there is a growing interest in interventions aimed at mobilizing the public against corruption and strengthening the demand for curbing corruption and promoting better forms of governance (Marie Chêne, 2008). Such Demand-side approaches cover a wide range of interventions aimed at promoting civic engagement in the procurement processes and their management.

In classical democratic theory, the justification for accountability related almost exclusively to elected representatives. In contemporary

governance thinking, by contrast, the objects of accountability initiatives quite centrally include non-elected public bureaucracies. This is not particularly surprising given the blurring, in recent times, of the line between the political and the administrative. The enlargement of bureaucracies and the often collaborative nature of their relationship with the political executive have made it difficult to attribute particular actions to either. The conceptual moorings of the idea of accountability are to be found in two affined traditions: first, the old public administration literature and its more recent *avatar*, the new public management; and second, the governance paradigm in which it appears, in a grander claim, as the magic formula to resolve most if not all problems of the public sector. However, in the neo-liberal context of complex relationships between public agencies, citizens re-designated as consumers or users, and the not necessarily public producers and/or providers of services, neither of these ideological frameworks provides a satisfactory account of the markers of accountability in general, or of how its adequacy or otherwise in particular areas such as service delivery maybe benchmarked.

METHODOLOGY

In this study, our overall research design consisted of a cross sectional survey of 11 local governments of Uganda. The first 10 local governments[†], were selected based on the findings of the National integrity Report (2006) in which it was observed that the higher the budget, the more likelihood the occurrence of procurement corruption. In that effort, we had to first assess Central Government Transfers to Local Governments for the 2010/11 financial year. We examined Development Grants and allocations from the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED, 2010/11) and each of the selected local governments had the following allocations:-

Table 1: showing the distribution of MoFPED Development grants

[†] They are also located in three of Uganda's five regions, i.e. Central, Western, and Northern Uganda.

LOCAL GOVT TRANSFERS 2010/2011			
Name of district	Development grants (Uganda Shillings-'000')	US Dollars(\$)	Ranking
Bushenyi District	36,855,703	16,024,219	1
Mukono District	36,422,495	15,835,867	2
Kampala City	34,573,742	15,031,800	3
Wakiso District	29,369,773	12,769,446	4
Masaka District	28,508,309	12,508,309	5
Lira District	27,770,068	12,073,942	6
Kasese District	27,534,230	11,971,404	7
Iganga District	26,926,583	11,576,775	8
Arua District	23,777,832	10,338,188	9
Gulu District	20,562,040	8,941,322	10
Rukungiri†	6,359,261	2,764,896	11

Source: MoFPED, Development Grant 2010/11

We used a survey instrument that had various sections and the opinions of the respondents on the nature and forms of public procurement corruption in the local governments was assessed basing on a four-likert scale ranging from 4 (strongly agree), 3 (agree), 2 (Disagree) and (1) strongly disagree. Twenty items were used as measures of the variables and were developed through review of existing literature on the general forms of corruption but more so as they relate to the public procurement corruption in a local government context. This instrument enabled us collect quantitative data. While we also had open ended questions that were used to enlist respondents opinion on the study subject, this paper only is based on the quantitative results. Before administering the questionnaire, a pilot study was carried out to ensure that the questions asked were not only relevant, but clearly understandable and that they made sense. We thus used the pilot study to determine validity and reliability of the questionnaire including the wording, structure and sequence of the questions. In testing reliability, it is recommended that a coefficient of 0.70 or more implies that there is

† Rukungiri District was sampled because of continued media reports of rampant corruption.

a high degree of data reliability (Mugenda & Mugenda, 1999). However, sometimes, a researcher may get away with using less reliable data if the sample size is very big or the variables under study differ greatly among the subjects. But where the sample size and variations among the subjects are small, a highly reliable data set is required to reveal the magnitude of these variations. In this study, the coefficient for the overall survey instrument was 0.905 the 106 items.

After confirming reliability of the data, we checked for the normality of our data. An assessment of the normality of data is a prerequisite for many statistical tests as normal data is an underlying assumption in parametric testing. We assessed the normality - graphically as well as numerically. We did test our normality based on the rule that if the Sig. value of the Shapiro-Wilk Test is greater the 0.05 then the data is normal. If it is below 0.05 then the data significantly deviate from a normal distribution. The analysis of the data used a combination of descriptive and factor analysis. The descriptive results included frequency distributions as well as the means and the standard deviations. Amin (2005:430) reminds us that factor analysis is a statistical technique that is used as a data reduction technique to identify a relatively small number of factors (constructs) from a set of many and interrelated variables. Factor analysis was used to establish the most prominent roles citizens played and the second level a co-relational analysis was adopted to establish statistical significance of the hypothesized relationships between demand side roles and reduced corruption. Factor analysis isolates the underlying factors that explain the data and through factor analysis, a set of interdependent relationships is examined. With the results emerging from factor analysis, researchers do not expect specification of dependent variables, independent variables, or causality but factor analysis assumes that all the rating data on different attributes can be reduced down to a few important dimensions. This reduction is possible because the attributes are related. The rating given to any one attribute is partially the result of the influence of other attributes.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Table 2 Areas where citizen involvement should be applied

Citizen involvement should be applied :	% Agree	% Disagree
During Procurement policy development	1218 (87.5%)	173 (12.4%)
During Public procurement spending decisions	1141(82%)	250(18%)
During Monitoring of public sector performance	1197(86.1%)	194(14%)
During Accountability for public resources	1179 (84.7%)	212(15.3%)
During Demanding better public service outcomes	1226 (88.1%)	165 (11.9%)
During the process of procurement planning	1104 (79.4%)	287 (20.6%)
During the process of bids evaluation	963 (69.2%)	428(30.7%)
During awarding of contracts	992(71.3%)	398 (28.6%)
During monitoring of contract performance	1157 (83.2%)	234(16.8%)

We asked respondents on the basis of a yes or no answer whether they were formally involved in procurement management at the local government level where upon 270 (19.4%) answered in the affirmative while 1121 (80.6%) answered no. This suggests that the majority of the citizens as construed from the sampled respondents do not participate in public procurement. On whether citizens should be involved in public procurement at the time of monitoring performance, 68 (4.9%) strongly disagreed, 126 (9.1%) disagreed compared to 610 (43.9%) that agreed and 587 (42.2%) that strongly agreed respectively. This means that 81.1% of our study respondents supported the need for citizens to be involved during monitoring performance stage which would constitute the contract management phase of the public procurement process. Relatedly, citizens can participate in public procurement at the time of accountability. There are different forms of accountability but specifically in our context horizontal and vertical accountability are of much relevance.

Citizens contribute by detecting corruption risks, promoting enhanced transparency of procurements and using their learning for evidence based advocacy for reform in the procurement area (Plumme and Cross, 2006). Procurement monitoring is an emerging area, where citizens' involvement has been experimented to address the impending waste and corruption in public procurement. However, public support is best obtained when people are convinced that their government is willing to investigate corrupt scandals and take

concrete actions against corrupt officials with neither fear nor favour (Blechinger, 2005). Conversely, citizens' apathy in reporting corrupt behaviour is likely to rise when the public believes that their complaints will not attract the appropriate attention of government. There is substantial evidence that citizens around the world have lost confidence and trust in the public sector (Peter, 2004). Advocates of institutional theory insist that a crucial part in shaping the incentives for engaging in public administration reforms (Padovani and Scorsone, 2009) was to create institutions and processes that promote accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector.

The analysis to the respondents question on whether citizen involvement should be applied during accountability of public resources which technically speaking relates to fiscal accountability indicated that only 79 (5.7%) and 133 (9.6%) strongly disagreed and disagreed respectively as compared to 526 (37.8%) and 653 (46.9%) who agreed and strongly agreed respectively. This implies that 84.7% of the study respondents highly agreed to the idea of citizens being involved in fiscal accountability.

Since public procurement is one important function of public financial management that has wider implications for improvements in service delivery, citizens can be assumed to measure the performance of a public procurement system through assessing the quality of public services being offered by local governments. Social Accountability (SAc) is a process of constructive engagement between citizens and government aimed at improving performance in the use of public resources to deliver services, enhance peoples' welfare, and protect individuals' rights. Two forces drive social accountability: citizen groups, who are direct beneficiaries of public services, and government, which provides the open space for citizen participation in monitoring public programs. Further, four elements are essential to creating an enabling environment in which social accountability can take effect; Organized and capable citizen groups; Government champions who are willing to engage; Broad access to public information; and contextual appropriateness of initiatives (World Bank Institute, 2010). Procurement planning is one of the most important stages of public procurement which determines budget

allocations. We asked our respondents their opinion on whether their involvement should be at the time of procurement planning. Responding to this question, 77 (5.5%) strongly disagreed, 210 (15.1%) disagreed but 612 (44.0%) agreed and 492 (35.4%) strongly agreed suggesting that 79.4% of the total respondents answered in the affirmative to our statement of citizens being involved during procurement planning.

On whether citizens should be involved during the evaluation of bids in local government procurement, 137 (9.8%) strongly disagreed, 291 (20.9%) disagreed compared to 576 (41.4%) who agreed and 387 (27.8%). While the majority of respondent agreed to the citizen's participation in the evaluation of bids, this particular variable also attracted a sizeable number of respondents who objected to this requirement suggesting the technical nature of evaluation of bids. The public procurement laws of Uganda entrust evaluation to a technical committee (evaluation committee) whose composition ought to have various specialties. For example, the bid evaluation exercise for a complex construction project will not need citizen involvement because they lack the required skills. The award process is critical to a well functioning public procurement process. Owing to the 'political maneuvers' that most local government award decisions go through, some people have advocated for a need to involve citizens at this level. While the citizens may not be involved in making the decisions, advocates of this strategy would wish to see those involved in awarding contracts monitored to check their excesses. In our study, we put this question to our respondents in as far as their perceptions on involvement of citizen during award of contracts. Our analysis reveals that 132 (9.5%) of the respondents disagreed strongly, 266 (19.1%) only disagreed compared to 582 (41.9%) who agreed and 410 (29.5%) who agreed strongly.

Finally, we asked the respondents to indicate their opinion on whether citizens can be involved during monitoring of contract performance. Of the total respondents, 88 (6.3%) strongly disagreed to this statement, 146 (10.5%) disagreed and 617 (44.4%) agreed while 540 (38.8%) agreed strongly. Strengthen civil society's role in monitoring (for instance through consumer voice and client power through report cards such as the Bangalore citizen report card) and consumer associations has been advocated for by Thampi (2005).

This is particularly important in Africa where civil society tends to be relatively immature and low in capacity. But civil society needs proper incentives including trained manpower and sufficient budget to participate in procurement monitoring.

EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO PROMOTE CITIZEN-DRIVEN APPROACHES

We first asked our respondents on whether they believed that approaches involving citizens and civil society organizations in fighting public procurement corruption were effectively being applied in Uganda. The responses analyzed indicated that the majority of respondents believed these approaches were not used. Of the total respondents, 280 (20.1%) indicated they were being applied compared to 1111 (79.9%) who indicated that they were in their opinion not being applied. We then enlisted respondent's views on what ought to be done to promote the effective approaches to promote citizen involvement, the findings are summarized in table 3.

Table 3 -Effective approaches to promote citizen-driven approaches

Items	SA	A	D	SD
Encourage awareness building	859(61.8%)	444(31.9%)	65(4.7%)	22(1.6%)
Encourage lobbying activities	484(34.8%)	622(44.7%)	182(13.1%)	103(7.4%)
Encourage organized protests	510(36.7%)	444(31.9%)	295(21.2%)	142(10.2%)
Participatory budgeting	625(44.9%)	580 (41.7%)	129(9.3%)	57(4.1%)
Citizen feedback mechanisms	650(46.7%)	599(43.1%)	100(7.2%)	42(3.0%)
Capacity building initiatives	659(47.4%)	595(42.8%)	108(7.8%)	29(2.1%)
Establish complaints mechanisms	545(39.2%)	628(45.1%)	165(11.9%)	53(3.8%)
Establishing independent monitoring groups	580(41.7%)	607(43.6%)	151(10.9%)	53(3.8%)
Participatory boards at local government	592(42.6%)	568(40.8%)	169(12.1%)	60(4.3%)
Promoting linkages with churches and NGOs	630(45.3%)	534(38.4%)	167(12.0%)	60 (4.3%)
Public hearings	640(46.0%)	547(39.3%)	134(9.6%)	70(5.0%)

Respondents when asked to score the effective approaches to promote citizen-driven approaches their opinions were as follows: Of the total respondents, 859 (61.8%) strongly agreed while

444(31.9%) agreed to statement of encouraging awareness. However 65(4.7%) and 22(1.6) disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively. The second significant approach was capacity building initiatives with a total score of 659 (47.4%) strongly agreed and 595 (42.8%) agreed while 108(7.8%) disagreed and 29 (2.1%) strongly disagreed. The third opinion was argued to be establishing citizens' feedback mechanisms. The score against this were: 650(46.7%) strongly agreed; 599 (43.1%) agreed while 100(7.2%) and 42(3.0%) disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively. This was followed by citizens' participatory budgeting which was scored as follows: 625(44.9%) strongly agreed and 580(41.7) agreed while 129(9.3%) disagreed and 57(4.1%) strongly disagreed. In the table above taking a combined opinion of agreed and strongly agreed, all scores were above 80%. This implies that the citizens believe that the approaches can be implemented though at differing degrees.

In a study conducted by the Africa Development Professional Group (ADP Group, 2008) it was emphasized that the characteristics of good public governance include a people-centered approach that enhances participatory development and promotes equity, transparency and accountability in the management of resources and service delivery. Such an approach provides avenues for the citizenry to voice their views, express their interests and preferences with a view of ensuring that local government decision-making, with regard to resource allocation and service delivery, is responsive to their needs and priorities. It should be noted that an effective oversight mechanism necessitates provision of channels of interaction between elected (politicians), technocrats and citizens which allow signals and preferences by the citizens to be translated into responsive policies by the elected and plans and actions by the appointed officials in the delivery of the much needed services.

When the citizens wish to portray their mistrust, they apply traditional accountability approaches that may include public demonstrations, advocacy campaigns, investigative journalism; and citizen report cards. They may also seek participatory public policy making, public expenditure tracking, and advocate for general "efforts to improve the effectiveness of "internal" accountability mechanisms of various levels of government. This is what Malena, Forster and Singh, (2004) refers to it as vertical accountability.

Whereas formal organizational structures should be able to handle easily anticipated problems, evidence in the literature confirms that when unexpected problems arise as Krackhardt and Hanson (1993) posits, informal organizations emerge. Bhatt (2002) suggests that employees often form their own informal communities of expertise from where they can get necessary pieces of knowledge. This trend has increased formal institutions in society. Stacey (1996) considers the prominence of informal organizations to be a function of two factors (1) the subordination of individuality related to the alienating and de-motivating nature of bureaucracies and (2) the inability of bureaucracies to handle environmental ambiguity and uncertainty. For this to happen, they need to be institutionalized. However, Citizens' apathy in reporting corrupt behaviour is likely to rise when the public believes that their complaints will not attract the appropriate attention of government. Advocates of institutional theory insist that a crucial part in shaping the incentives for engaging in public administration reforms (Padovani and Scorsone, 2009) was to create institutions and processes that promote accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector. Okoya (2010) argues that the failure of the public to test the provisions of their public procurement laws and regulations which declares documents in the bidding process for award of contracts to be public documents is therefore inexplicable

HOW CITIZEN INVOLVMENT MAYBE APPLIED

In the context of governance, participation extends beyond government and its structures. It includes a number of non-state actors.

Table 4 Perceptions on how to involve citizens in public procurement

Citizen involvement should be done thru:	SA	A	D	SD
Citizens themselves	640 (46.0%)	551(39.6%)	148(10.6%)	52(3.7%)
Civil society organizations	477 (34.3%)	617(44.4%)	223(16.0%)	74(5.3%)
Elected members of parliament	303 (21.8%)	358(25.7%)	433(31.1%)	297(21.4%)
Elected councils at local level	386 (27.7%)	537(38.6%)	317(22.8%)	151(10.9)
Opinion leaders	336 (24.2%)	479(34.4%)	346(24.9%)	229(16.5%)
Technical administrators	365 (26.2%)	665(47.8%)	249(17.9%)	110(7.9%)

Traditional leaders	263 (18.9%)	482(34.7%)	412(9.6%)	234(16.8%)
Already existing institutions	311 (22.4%)	665(47.8%)	266(19.1%)	149(10.7%)
Local media	570 (41.0%)	557(40.7%)	190(13.7%)	74(5.3%)
Development partners	433 (31.1%)	692(49.7%)	183(13.2%)	79(5.7%)
Through political parties	233 (16.8%)	525(37.7%)	283(20.3%)	350(25.2%)
Cultural institutions	273 (19.6%)	519(37.3%)	352(25.3%)	247(17.8%)

Respondents were probed as to how they can get involved in public procurement. Findings confirm some contradictions with some of the governance prescriptions especially in the context of local governments in a developing country.. Findings also suggest that citizen involvement to be effective is likely to be distributed to a wide range of actors if the impact is to be felt. Basing on the table 4 above, the majority, of the respondents gave more weight to citizens' involvement as crucial to the fight against corruption. This is illustrated by 1191(85.9%) and 200 (14.3%) disagreed. This was followed by involvement of the local media as follows: 1127 (81.7%) agreed and 264(19.0%) disagreed. While 1125 (79.8%) believed in the use of development partners, 262 (18.9%) disagreed. In toe was the opinion that Civil society organizations could too be used with the following results; 1094 (78.7%) agreed and 297 (21.3%) disagreed. Use of political, cultural or traditional leaders was less preferred approaches. This could possibly imply that citizens have lost confidence in certain institutions.

Findings also confirm some contradictions with some of the governance prescriptions especially in the context of local governments in a developing country. Mistrust of the elected representatives of the people. Findings also suggest that citizen involvement to be effective is likely to be distributed to a wide range of actors if the impact is to be felt. Citizens can promote and demand greater transparency around the actions of politicians and public officials thus creating disincentives for their engagement in corrupt transactions. Transparency can be developed in various forms at the project, community or sector level through publicizing utility accounts, budgets, contracting arrangements and annual reports, and public hearings by regulators. Access to information is essential to improve demand for accountability. However, typically citizens may have no

knowledge of recurrent and capital costs making it possible for public officials to make decisions that misallocate resources, or tap into limited budgets, and they need to be able to access information about complaints mechanisms and their rights as citizens (Plumme and Cross, 2006). Best practice suggests that transparency helps reduce corruption; it increases the likelihood of exposure and reduces the discretion of public officials. Transparency related reforms however, remain checkered around the globe and notably low in Africa (Kaufmann, 2005).

ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

CSOs have emerged as partners of local governments in areas such as (i) seeking voice in local development planning and budgeting processes; (ii) holding local governments accountable in the allocation of local resources; (iii) enhancing local revenues; and (iv) tracking the use of resources and the impact of local policies and programs (Thindwa, 2006). Porto Alegre in Brazil has become a model for participatory budgeting. This model entails close involvement of regional assemblies and participatory budget councils in allocating resources and monitoring how they are used.

Table 5 Descriptive analysis results on the role of CSOs

CSOs can:	SA	A	D	SD
Build citizen literacy on public financial management	691(49.7%)	616(44.3%)	53 (3.8%)	30(2.2%)
Have networks and expertise to detect corruption cases	583(41.9%)	623(44.8%)	143(10.3%)	42(3.0%)
Augment limited capacity in audit institutions	424(30.5%)	769(55.3%)	154(11.1%)	44(3.2%)
Monitor and build pressure on local governments	496(35.7%)	694(49.9%)	136(9.8%)	65(4.7%)
Pioneer innovative audit methodologies to monitor projects	504(36.2%)	683(49.1%)	168(12.1%)	36(2.6%)
Conduct independent audits	465(33.4%)	696(50.0%)	161(11.6%)	68(4.9%)
Use audit findings by government to hold officers accountable	541(38.9%)	673(48.4%)	127(9.1%)	50(3.6%)
Work closely with PPDA compliance units	514(37.0%)	703(50.5%)	122(8.8%)	52(3.7%)

Respondents were asked what role CSO could play and the majority had the following opinions: Building citizen literacy on public financial management scored 1307 (94%) agreed while 83(6.0%) disagreed. Work closely with PPDA compliance units weighted 1217 (87.5%) agreed while 174(12.5%) disagreed. The other opinion was use audit findings by government to hold officers accountable. Here 1214(87.3%) agreed while 177(12.7%) disagreed. Whereas having networks and expertise to detect corruption cases scored 1206 (85.8%) as agreed others had the opinion that it was necessary to augment limited capacity in audit institutions 119(85.3%). Sahr (1999), however, argues that the challenge in assessing political will.

We asked our respondents whether in their view, they believed that the anti-corruption efforts in local governments at a general level have been successful. In their response, 193 (13.9%) answered in the affirmative compared to a majority number of 1156 (83.1%) who believed that the anti-corruption efforts had not been successful. With this overwhelming number of respondents who attested that the efforts were not successful, we went further to analyze the reasons why in their view they were not successful and what strategies they could offer to reverse the trend. The rating of the reasons why anti-corruption efforts had not been successful according to the perceptions of our study respondents were as follows:-

4.4. Reasons for the Failure of anti-corruption efforts

Table 6: why anti-corruption efforts fail?

ITEMS	SA	A	D	SD
Lack of Political will among decision makers	686(49.3%)	552(39.7%)	104(7.5%)	49(3.5%)
Limited power and resources to accomplish reforms	496(35.7%)	571(41.0%)	187(13.4%)	137(9.8%)
Overambitious and unrealistic promises	555(39.9%)	630(45.3%)	151(10.9%)	55(4.0%)
Uncoordinated reforms	432(31.1%)	630(45.3%)	171(12.3%)	158(11.4%)
Reforms that relied too much on law enforcement	403(29.0%)	695(50.0%)	220(15.8%)	73(5.2%)
Reforms strategies that targeted only low level officials	522(37.5%)	525(37.7%)	138(9.9%)	206(14.8%)
Reform strategies that did not deliver	492(35.4%)	665(47.8%)	170(12.2%)	64(4.6%)

quick wins				
Reforms that were not fully institutionalized	474(34.1%)	671(48.2%)	156(11.2%)	90(6.5%)

When asked the reasons responsible for the failure of anticorruption efforts, respondents had the opinion that lack of Political will among decision makers was the most prominent with 1238 (89.0%) followed by overambitious and unrealistic promises 1185(83.2%). Other reasons of concern were strategies that did not deliver quick wins 1157 (83.2%); Reforms that were not fully institutionalized 1145 (82.3%) and reforms that relied too much on law enforcement 1098 (79%).

CREATING A SUCCESSFUL ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY

Respondents agreed overwhelmingly that creating a successful anti corruption strategy required: effective monitoring systems 1304 (93.7%); well-defined support from all stakeholders 1302 (93.6%); Extensive citizen awareness 1285(93.2%) and adequate power to anti-corruption agencies 1279 (90.9%) among others. Collins (2011: 88-89) contends that approaches in addressing corruption have often been of two forms; – firstly, approaches aimed at restraining unethical or corrupt behavior through legal and regulatory sanctions, codes of conduct, independent watchdogs in the public sector or in the private sector and the practice of whistle blowing (this is the formal approach). The second approach has been the increased stressing of the role of civic education with the aim of increasing public awareness. This would lead to awareness about their right to acceptable standards of services from government and innovative experiential learning and facilitated reflexivity aimed at public and private sectors alike at the rediscovery of the higher purpose. Based on our results, we developed a model as presented in figure 1 below. We ranked these factors based on respondents highest likert scale positioning at “Agreeable” and “strongly agreeable”, then distributed them across three and then two dimensions extracted from Bovis(2005) and Collins, (2011) as shown in the figure below:




Figure 1: A citizenry based anti-corruption strategy model

Experience has shown that in most countries there is no single approach has been effective in addressing the problem of

corruption. We acknowledge that it is a fight that cannot be won in a day, but rather over a long period of time. We also recognize Tanzi's (2002) concerns that the greatest mistake that can be made is to rely on a strategy that depends excessively on actions in a single area – such as increasing salaries of public sector employees, increasing penalties and creating an anti-corruption office – and then expect quick results. As Osei-Tutu et al., (2009) posits, the battle against corruption should begin with a strong citizenry and explicit commitment to eradicate all its manifestations. However, we argue that anti-corruption reform of the public procurement should start with the civil servants and politicians by first disclosing the state budgets, secondly, keeping accounts, thirdly, establish external monitoring systems and fourthly, improve public access to bureaucratic and political information. It is increasingly recognized that public support is very vital in any anti-corruption programme (Kaufman et al., 2008). However, public support is best obtained when people are convinced that their government is willing to investigate corrupt scandals and take concrete actions against corrupt officials with neither fear nor favour (Blechinger, 2005). Conversely, citizens' apathy in reporting corrupt behaviour is likely to rise when the public believes that their complaints will not attract the appropriate attention of government. There is substantial evidence that citizens around the world have lost confidence and trust in the public sector (Peter, 2004). Advocates of institutional theory insist that a crucial part in shaping the incentives for engaging in public administration reforms (Padovani and Scorsone, 2009) was to create institutions and processes that promote accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector.

It should be noted that best practice suggests that more demand-side (informal) efforts are needed to support the technical approaches (formal) to improved procurement performance carried out in many countries over the last decade. Further, consideration is needed of the applicability and impact of all approaches, their blending and sequencing within the public procurement and in particular contexts. Effective anti-corruption policy depends on sound diagnosis and understanding of the procurement context by all players including the citizens. As such, there is a growing interest in interventions aimed at mobilizing the public against corruption and strengthening the

demand for curbing corruption and promoting better forms of governance (Marie Chêne, 2008). Such Demand-side approaches cover a wide range of interventions aimed at promoting civic engagement in the procurement processes and their management.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Oakerson (1989, p.114) asserts that to be accountable is "to have to answer for one's actions or inaction". Accountability involves officials being responsible for the consequences of their actions or inactions (Burke, 1986 and Cooper, 1990). Efforts focused at improving accountability in the public procurement occur on both supply and demand sides. A significant contribution to formal political accountability and a transparent operating environment is also made by increasing the role of the media (Stapenhurst 2000), and by utilizing e-government for transparent record management. As politicians (elected) play a representative advocacy role and also take on the responsibility of being democratically accountable to the electorate for the decisions made "under their watch", the technocrats too must be accountable to the beneficiaries as well as the principal (Mulgan, 2006; Stoker, 2006; Caldwell, Bakker and Read, 2007). Phillips, Caldwell and Callender, (2007) insist that citizens should hold politicians and technocrats accountable for public procurement for better service delivery.

LIMITATIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Governance is a touchy issue in Uganda, given the pressures citizens and other stakeholders put on accountability. This could have deterred respondents from disclosing facts especially the politicians and technocrats. However, this was overcome by assuring the respondents of confidentiality. Also not much empirical research has been carried out and published in Uganda, hence the less scholarly literature on which to base the development of the study. More so, no interviews were carried out. The generalization of our findings is limited to Uganda by sample and method and given that corruption is multifaceted. The cross sectional survey design adopted yielded snapshot results that should be taken with caution. This is against

the background that procurement issues and problems maybe better investigated over a period of time with some degree of accuracy, as opposed to snapshot investigations. We therefore recommend use of hybrid of research designs where both qualitative, plus use of observation with second phase follow-up interviews to reduce on ambiguities in the data collected.

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